Share purchase plans (SPPs) are offered exclusively to a company's registered shareholders, who may purchase up to $5,000 worth of shares in a 12 month period at a discount to the market price and without any brokerage charge. They have become one of the most frequently used mechanisms for raising publicly-traded equity capital in Australia, yet little is known about them from a financial markets perspective. We address this deficiency by documenting the characteristics of Australian firms that have adopted SPPs and assessing their short term and long term valuation implications. We find that SPPs are more likely to be issued by firms with lower levels of liquidity and relatively large numbers of shareholders. They have a negative announcement effect, which is associated with the size of the issue, the prior share price runup, the issue price discount, the firm's industry, and whether there is enough time for non-shareholders to buy shares in order to participate. Long run underperformance is also found over extended periods, consistent with much of the seasoned equity offering (SEO) literature.
Share Purchase Plans in Australia: Issuer characteristics and valuation implications 1. Introduction
We investigate three aspects of share purchase plans [hereafter SPPs]: (1) the characteristics of firms that issue shares via SPPs; (2) how share prices behave around the time of an SPP announcement; and (3) the long term investment performance of firms that implement an SPP. Apart from our own work, 1 no research has been published on SPPs so far.
SPPs are a form of seasoned equity offering (SEO). The first Australian issue via an SPP was undertaken by CSR in 1991 when it offered shareholders the opportunity to subscribe for new shares worth $2,400 (The Intelligent Investor 2005) . Following regulatory changes in September 2002 that allowed for subscriptions up to a maximum of $5,000 per shareholder (the prior cap was $3,000), the popularity of SPPs has increased substantially.
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The focus of the Australian literature on equity raisings has been largely on initial public offerings (IPOs). Two studies (Dehnert 1992 and 1993) in the last 15 years have addressed the share price reaction to various SEO announcements in Australia, while three (Allen and Soucik 1999a , Allen and Soucik 1999b and Brown, Gallery and Goei 2006 have addressed aspects of long run performance following an SEO. We extend this literature by examining evidence of both short and long run performance associated with an SPP issue. This evidence is interesting given SPPs do not require the issue of a prospectus, indicating the issue can occur within a more asymmetric information environment than rights issues, which during the sample period did require a prospectus. and of comparable size. There is a negative share price reaction to the announcement of an SPP, measured relative to the market return in the announcement period. The size of the reaction is related to the size of the issue, the prior share price runup, the issue price discount, the firm's industry, and whether there is enough time for non-shareholders to buy shares in order to participate. We also document significant underperformance for some years after the event. The SPP-issuer did not perform as badly if it was in the mining industry, if it was audited by a 'Big-N' firm, or if the issue was underwritten.
Conversely, the greater the issue discount the worse the issuer's long run performance.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and sets out our predictions for each of the three components of the study: SPP issuer characteristics, announcement effects, and the long run investment performance of SPP issuers. Section 3 lays out the research method and describes the data. Section 4
contains the results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Prior Literature and Predictions

SPP issuer characteristics
Lee and Kocher 2001 compare the characteristics of firms making private placements with those issuing shares by public offering. They analyse six determinants, including firm size, dividends, growth opportunities, free cash flow, overvaluation and ownership fraction. Burton and Power 2003 examine the decision between a rights issue and a private placement. They examine seven attributes where theory suggests differences might exist between the two classes of equity issuer: firm size, growth opportunities, liquidity, profitability, dividend behaviour, the offer method used for the most recent previous equity issue, and shareholder structure.
Based on the equity issuance literature, we posit a model to predict the issue of SPPs. A comparison of the characteristics of SPP-issuing firms and a matched sample of non-SPP-issuing firms is conducted. Eight firm characteristics are identified from the prior literature and analysis of SPPs: growth and investment opportunities, liquidity, profitability, cash holdings, leverage, dividend behaviour, shareholder structure, and overseas exchange listing. We control for a ninth factor, firm size, in much of the analysis.
Intuitively, firms with greater growth and investment opportunities are more likely to raise additional equity capital. However, studies show public offering and rights issuers typically have lower growth and fewer investment opportunities (Lee and Kocher 2001 and Power 2003) . Consequently, we make no directional prediction for this variable. For liquidity, the pecking order theory (Donaldson 1961, Myers and Majluf 1984) predicts firms issuing SPPs are less liquid.
Pecking order theory and empirical evidence differentiating between debt and equity issues leads us to predict equity issuing firms are less profitable. However, the free cash flow argument (Jensen 1986) , also supported by evidence, indicates public offerors and rights issuers are more profitable than placement firms (Hertzel and Smith 1993 ).
Thus we do not predict the direction of any relationship for profitability. Two conflicting predictions also apply to cash holdings. Specifically, the pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship, while a positive relationship is predicted by the free cash flow argument. Consequently no direction is predicted for this relationship either. Similarly, no directional prediction is made for leverage. In terms of dividend behaviour, both the pecking order and free cash flow theories predict a negative relationship between issuing SPPs and the payment of dividends (Kocher and Lee 2001, Burton and Power 2003) . Eckbo and Masulis 1992 show the importance of current shareholder demand for a new equity offering. Managers expecting low (high) shareholder participation select firm commitment public offers (rights issues). An issue feature of SPPs has restricted firms to issuing shares up to a current maximum of $5,000 to each shareholder. We suspect this feature is the result of regulators' conservatism and is unrelated to any concerns about shareholder concentration or managerial ownership. Given the upper limit per shareholder, the aggregate amount a firm can raise this way depends on the number of shareholders. We thus predict a firm with a larger number of shareholders is more likely to issue an SPP, all else equal.
Lastly, an SPP is generally restricted to shareholders who are residents of Australia or New Zealand. This is for practical reasons as well as the fact that offers of this nature are illegal in some foreign jurisdictions. For a firm to maximise the issue proceeds, its shareholders must be eligible to participate. A firm listed only on the Australian or New Zealand stock exchanges probably has a greater proportion of Australian and New Zealand shareholders and thus will be more likely to issue an SPP.
To summarise, we predict SPPs are more likely to be adopted by firms that are less liquid, do not pay dividends, have a more disperse share register, and are traded only in Australia and New Zealand. Other factors likely to matter are the firm's growth opportunities, profitability, cash holdings and leverage, but there are conflicting views with respect to the direction of any effect they may have.
SPP announcement effects
SPPs provide a unique opportunity to measure the relative influence of factors related to the overall announcement effect because the SPP detail announcement includes specific information regarding the plan, such as the record date for eligible shareholders, the closing date for applications and instructions on how to participate. Lai 2000 report inconsistent evidence regarding the relationship between the issue price discount and the market reaction to the offering, so no directional prediction is made.
Many factors could determine the discount for an SPP. One is that the discount must be large enough for the board to be confident that, when the plan closes, the issue price is still below the market price, otherwise shareholders will not subscribe. Further, the discount is limited by the ASX Listing Rules, which stipulate the issue price must be at least 80% of the average market price for securities in that class. The average is calculated over the last 5 days on which sales were recorded, either before the day the SPP details are announced or before the day the issue is made.
Empirical findings and the information asymmetry hypothesis suggest the share price reaction to the SPP detail announcement will be less favourable for industrial firms than for public utilities. The basic argument should be particularly applicable to the Australian share market, which includes a sizeable number of mining firms. Asquith and Mullins 1986, who show announcement period returns are positively related to the share price runup over the preceding 12 months. Given the more recent evidence, we predict a higher share price runup will be associated with a more negative announcement effect.
The pecking order theory predicts firms will use equity financing as a last resort, and is consistent with the argument that there is an unfavourable share price reaction when an equity issue is used to refinance debt. Thus we predict a more unfavourable share price reaction for SPPs that announce the proceeds are to be used this way.
The information asymmetry argument suggests an underwriter plays a signalling role by credibly monitoring and certifying the issuing firm. Since SPPs do not need to be underwritten (ASX Listing Rule 7.1), the decision to spend additional monies on underwriting is a positive signal. Therefore, we predict the announcement effect will be more favourable when the SPP is underwritten.
The 'underwriter certification' argument suggests a less unfavourable share price reaction when the price of an underwritten issue is known beforehand. Under a firm commitment offering in the US, the price is not set until after the announcement, giving rise to a potentially negative announcement effect. SPPs are an interesting setting because they do not have to be underwritten and there is no restriction regarding when the price of the plan must be announced. We predict a less favourable reaction to an SPP detail announcement when the price of the plan is not stated until later.
SPPs offer existing shareholders the opportunity to pay a fixed maximum dollar amount to subscribe for additional shares. The offer is not on a pro rata basis but rather it is an equal entitlement independent of the number of shares already held. Based on their evidence, we similarly predict a favourable announcement effect where the SPP is accompanied by a private placement during the SPP offer period.
Lastly, the record date can be important because it is the date when the issuer determines who may participate in the SPP. For some plans the record date occurs before the SPP detail announcement so that non-shareholders are unable to purchase shares and become eligible to participate. For other plans the record date is after the SPP detail announcement and the share price potentially could be affected by the actions of nonshareholder investors wishing to participate. 5 We predict the announcement effect will be more favourable for plans that have a record date after the announcement date, due to temporary order imbalance reflecting the increased demand for the stock. However, it may not be a significant factor because a would-be investor needs to hold only one share to qualify. There is likely to be an offsetting, negative effect, because the additional shares are offered at a discount. This effect, too, on average will be small (of the order of 0.5%) because the average discount is about 10%, the issue size averages about 15% of previous capital and any dilution effect on share prices is likely to occur closer to the record date, which is after the announcement period for a substantial fraction of SPPs (refer Table 2 , discussed below).
In summary, we predict a less favourable market reaction to an SPP's announcement by a mining firm, where the offer is larger, the prior runup is greater, the proceeds are used to settle debts, the issue is not underwritten, directors do not commit to participating, there is no accompanying private placement, the issue price is unknown and the record date is either before or within the event period. We make no specific prediction about the direction of any association with firm size or the size of the offer discount, but acknowledge that it could be statistically different from zero.
The long run investment performance of SPP issuers
The literature has identified many factors affecting the post-offer returns of IPOs and SEOs (Brown, Gallery and Goei 2006) . to issue a going concern opinion on their financially distressed clients. We thus predict the appointment of a large audit firm will mitigate future long run underperformance. We also consider the audit opinion, and predict poorer long run performance by companies with qualified audit reports.
In a similar manner, underwriters can protect their reputation by marketing firms with better prospects. Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994 argue investors use the quality of the underwriter to assess the credibility of the equity issuer. 
Data and Method
SPP issuer characteristics
We match each SPP issuer with another firm in the same industry (using either the 10 GICS industry sectors or the ASX 2-digit industry number, as available at the time of the issue) and of comparable size, based on market capitalisation as at the last balance date before the SPP detail announcement. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 1984 illustrate industry is an important matching variable by reporting industrial classifications determine approximately 54% of the cross-sectional variance in leverage ratios. Three other proxies for firm size are total assets (Taub 1975 and Power 2003) , capital employed (Marsh 1982) and sales (Chiarella, Pham, Sim and Tan 1991 and Titman and Wessels 1988) . We do not use the last two measures because a substantial proportion of our sample comprises mining and oil exploration companies, for which they are less reliable indicators of scale. We exclude other SPP-issuing firms as a potential match.
Two methods are used to examine the difference between SPP-issuing firms and their matched counterparts. First, we assess differences in means via a t-test and also conduct a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test on each explanatory variable.
Second, a multivariate model is used to predict whether a firm is likely to issue an SPP based on a number of firm characteristics. We fit the model via logistic regression, similar to Cragg and Baxter 1970 , Taub 1975 , Marsh 1982 and Burton and Power 2003 .
The dichotomous dependent variable =1 for the SPP-issuing firm and =0 for its match.
The explanatory variables include growth and investment opportunities, liquidity, profitability, cash holdings, leverage, dividend behaviour, shareholder structure and overseas exchange listing (other than New Zealand). These variables are measured as at the last available balance date prior to either the SPP detail announcement or, where that date is unavailable, the date of the first announcement of the plan. To cater for extreme values, all continuous explanatory variables are winsorised at the 2% level.
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The total sample includes all SPPs announced between 1991, when the first SPP analysis to ensure our results are robust to industry effects. Third, a number of firms issued more than one SPP over the sample period. Three hundred and ninety-three firms issued at least one and 100 firms issued more than one. The largest number of issues by any one firm was 12, by Lend Lease Corporation, which was followed by Argo Investments Limited with 11 (both are financial firms).
[ Table 1 ] 10 The increase in SPPs is consistent with anecdotal evidence that "SPPs accompanying institutional placements have become so popular in the last two years that they are overtaking rights issues as a way of capital raising" (McCallum 2002) . One reason for the increased prevalence of SPPs is "in the right circumstances, they can be good for both the company and its small shareholders" (The Intelligent Investor 2005). Further, companies are attracted to SPPs "because they do not involve the costs or time delays involved in issuing a prospectus for a rights issue, they do not need an underwriter and there is no period of uncertainty for the stock while the rights are traded" (McCallum 2002 Descriptive statistics for the full sample of SPPs are presented in Panel A of Table   2 . The mean discount for the sample is 11.12%. The average SPP raised $10.4 million, or about 7.2% of the pre-existing market capitalization. 13 The average time taken to effect the issue was 51 days, while the average uptake rate was 66%. Panel B of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the share price reaction and factors possibly affecting the reaction to the SPP detail announcement. The mean (median) anticipated relative offering size was 14.8% (12.9%). Because firms often indicated the maximum amount allowed subject to ASX Listing Rules and ASIC restrictions rather than the amount expected to be raised, alternative measures of size are employed in the analysis, including the log of 15% of the firm's market capitalisation on the announcement date (relative offering size (restricted)) and the natural logarithm of the dollar value of total assets. of cases the record date was more than five days after the announcement date.
[ Table 2 ] confirms this result, with an average book-to-market value of equity ratio of 0.78 for their total sample. This is consistent with the discussion above regarding the use of proceeds.
Specifically, mining companies often indicated the proceeds would be used to fund a feasibility study, or to develop a specific project, or for exploration. Many of the relevant assets would be 'off-balance sheet'.
[ Table 3 ]
The current ratio, a measure of liquidity, has a mean (median) of 4.83 (1.77). Data attrition is documented in Table 4 . One hundred and eighty-three cases were lost through lack of data when analysing the financing decision and 330 when analysing announcement effects.
SPP-issuing firms
[ Table 4 ] return, and (2) the narrow event window means that any influence of risk on expected return should be immaterial. We measure abnormal return by the difference between the stock's (log) return and the market (log) return over the event window. The ASX All
SPP announcement effects
Ordinaries Accumulation Index is used to calculate the daily market return.
The reconciliation of the sample used to capture the announcement effect is contained in Panel B of Table 4 . For 48 plans, no SPP detail announcement was provided to the ASX. Of the 48, 37 were before 2002. One in three of the earlier plans did not provide details but since then the ratio has fallen to about one in 50. A further six plans had insufficient share price data, preventing the measurement of their returns. In addition, 276 plans did not have data relating to one or more of the explanatory variables, in particular, the relative offering size (both anticipated and restricted), share price runup or discount (both calculated and stated).
The long run investment performance of SPP issuers
Long horizon event studies employ numerous methods to measure the long run performance of firms. Concerns arise regarding the most appropriate benchmark, holding period and test statistic to employ. There is also the question, how should returns given both are reasonably well specified, especially when using a single matched firm benchmark, and they have the greatest power across four common alternatives (Ang and Zhang 2004) . larger proportion of non-top 20 shareholders, which is a proxy for the number of shareholders from whom funds may be raised. Arguably firms with a larger number of registered shareholders have the potential to raise a greater amount under an SPP.
Results
Characteristics that differentiate SPP firms
[ Table 5 ] the free cash flow argument. Finally, the percentage held by non-top 20 shareholders is significantly positive. This is consistent with SPP firms having a larger number of eligible shareholders and thereby the potential to raise more funds by an SPP. The classificatory accuracy of the base model is 65%.
[ Table 6 ] Sensitivity analysis of the base model is also presented in Table 6 . The second model in Table 6 excludes all financial firms, to be consistent with most empirical research addressing capital structure (Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 2002) . This model has a pseudo R 2 of 10.15%, consistent with the base model. The only differences are that the predicted direction is found for both dividend behaviour and overseas exchange, although again neither coefficient is significant. Mining firms are used exclusively in the third model, the aim being to identify any greater predictive ability in an industry having higher information asymmetry. The pseudo R 2 is 12.08% but the classificatory accuracy increases marginally. Finally, two models are fitted to SPPs with and without an associated placement. Consistent with the univariate analysis, the results show minimal difference between the two sub-samples. The main difference arises from liquidity, which is not statistically significant for cases where there was no private placement. Table 7 shows the average share price reaction to the SPP detail announcement, over the day -1 to 0 announcement window, is -0.4%, which according to a standard t-test is insignificant at the 10% level. However, returns are characterized by skewness and kurtosis, and the ranks test is significant at the 5% level. The return for the four days before the announcement is on average +0.7% (significant at the 5% level for a t-test but not significant for a Wilcoxon test); and it averages -2.3% over the six days beginning the day before the announcement (significant at the 1% level for both tests). The latter result is consistent with the announcement of an SPP being bad news for shareholders, since the average drop-off due to the discount on the SPP shares is likely to be of the order of 0.5%, as explained earlier.
SPP announcement effects
[ Table 7 ]
Many SPPs (39% of the sample) are issued with an associated placement. Further preliminary analysis was done on the share price reaction and associated factors contained in the SPP detail announcement (day -1 to 0) for SPPs that were and were not accompanied by a share placement. Consistent with prior literature, sample firms with an associated placement experience a less negative share price reaction although the difference is not significant at the 10% level. The relative offering size (anticipated) is larger when there is no associated placement, suggesting SPPs that accompany placements are smaller than stand alone SPPs. Those with an associated placement also experience a larger share price runup (10% on average, compared to the 3.5% for stand alone SPPs). This suggests firms issuing placements are concerned about timing the issue, which is arguably more important for a larger issue such as a private placement.
Generally, firms with SPPs and an associated placement are more likely to use the proceeds to reduce debt or strengthen the balance sheet. They are also significantly more likely to engage an underwriter, consistent with evidence that many private placements are underwritten (Hertzel and Smith 1993) . Further, the price is determined and announced for SPPs with an associated placement for a significantly larger proportion of firms, consistent with findings that many SPPs are issued at the private placement price or a slight discount to it. and 1996.
[ Figure 1] A number of multivariate regression models were fitted by OLS to explain the within-sample variance of the share price reaction to the SPP detail announcement (measured over days -1 to +4) and to conduct robustness tests. The results are presented in supports the information asymmetry argument; specifically, announcing a larger offer is associated with a larger drop in share price.
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[ Table 8] When we exclude financial firms (column 4), confine the sample to mining firms (column 5), and fit the model separately to plans with and without an associated share placement (columns 6 and 7), the principal results are robust. 16 The direction of the coefficients on significant predictors -including offer size, runup, discount, industry and eligibility -are all consistent with the base model. The adjusted R 2 ranges from 9.10% to 22.80% and all models are significant. Table 9 summarises long-run performance over one, two and three year horizons after the issue's announcement. The results are tabulated for two matched pair designs:
Long run performance after the issue
(1) each issuer is matched with a non-SPP issuing firm based on size and industry; and (2) each issuer's performance is benchmarked against a comprehensive, equally weighted market index benchmark. 17 The return is measured by the log of the buy-and-hold return for the indicated holding period. While there is no significant difference between the log return on the SPP issuer and its industry and size-matched counterpart in the first year after the SPP announcement month, in all other cases significant underperformance is found, with the significance level varying according to the benchmark and whether a ttest or ranks tests is applied. In sum, the results in Table 9 indicate SPP firms suffer significant long-run underperformance throughout the three years following the capital raising.
For robustness, we also implemented the CTAR procedure. In brief, 18 when the monthly excess return on the portfolio comprising firms that had announced an SPP at any time during the previous 36 months was regressed by Weighted Least Squares (the weight was the number of stocks in the portfolio that month) on the market excess return and the returns on the size and book-to-market hedge portfolios, we estimated an average abnormal return of -0.6% per month (t=-2.41, significant at 1% on a one-tailed test).
When the structural equation was extended to include a momentum factor, it only added noise: the estimated abnormal return was still -0.6% per month (extending for 36 months) but its significance level dropped to 0.05. For both CTAR models, the adjusted R 2 was of the order of 0.89.
[ Table 9 ]
When a cross-sectional regression model of factors affecting the long-run performance of SPP issuers was fitted by Ordinary Least Squares, the dependent variable being the issuer's three year post-event return in excess of the market benchmark, we found the SPP-issuer did not perform as badly if it was in the mining industry, if it was made by a company audited by a 'Big-N' audit firm, 19 and if the issue was underwritten.
Conversely, the greater the issue discount the worse the long run performance. The model adjusted R 2 was 14.6% (p<0.01, N=173).
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Conclusion
We have provided the first detailed empirical evidence on three important facets of SPPs in Australia.
First, we explored features of SPPs and the characteristics that distinguish SPPissuing firms from comparable firms in the same industry. The results showed SPPissuing firms are differentiated from their peers by lower levels of liquidity and cash holdings, and more disperse shareholdings.
Second, we examined the announcement effect of SPP issues and factors explaining the size of the market's reaction. Share prices, measured relative to the market, react negatively to the announcement of an SPP, with the size of the share price reaction being related to the size of the issue, the prior share price runup, the issue price discount, the firm's industry, and whether there is enough time for non-shareholders to buy shares in order to participate. The results were robust across industry, regulatory changes to SPP provisions and whether or not there is an associated share placement.
Third, we examined the long-run performance of SPP firms for periods up to three years after the announcement. Performance initially was measured by the issuing firm's buy-and-hold log return relative to that of a comparably-sized firm in the same industry, and to a broadly-based market index. Typically, we found long-run underperformance by the issuing firm over extended periods after the event. The CTAR procedure advocated by Fama 1998 confirmed this result. Cross-sectional regression analysis revealed some evidence that the SPP-issuer did not perform as badly if it was in the mining industry, if it was audited by a 'Big-N' firm, or if the issue was underwritten. Conversely, the greater the issue discount the worse the issuer's long run performance.
19 Sixty per cent of the SPP issues were made by clients of Big-N firms. 20 The results are not tabulated to conserve space but are available from the corresponding author. % of total 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 6% 21% 25% 25% 9% 100% = total dollar amount of capital raised Issue size relative to market cap (%) = total dollar amount of capital raised scaled by market capitalisation at the month end prior to the SPP detail announcement Time to issue (days) = difference between the date SPP shares are allotted and the date of the SPP detail announcement (or first announcement of the SPP) (in days) Uptake rate (%) = % of the amount raised to the anticipated amount to be raised Return = mean excess return over the announcement period (day -1 to 0) Offering size (Ant) = anticipated number of shares issued divided by the number of shares outstanding prior to the issue plus the anticipated number of shares Offering size (Res) = natural logarithm of 15% of market capitalization on the announcement day Firm size = natural logarithm of total assets Runup = share return over last 60 trading days before SPP detail announcement Discount (Cal) = 1 minus the SPP offer price divided by the average closing price prevailing on the 5 days prior the SPP detail announcement Discount (Stated) = percentage discount stated in the SPP detail announcement Industry = 1 if the firm is classified as a mining firm, 0 otherwise Use = 1 if the intended use of proceeds is to reduce debts and/or strengthen the balance sheet, 0 otherwise Director = 1 if directors wereto participate in the SPP detail announcement, 0 otherwise Underwriter = 1 if SPP is underwritten SPP, 0 otherwise Price = 1 if the SPP price is indicated in the SPP detail announcement, 0 otherwise Placement = 1 if an associated placement is indicated, 0 otherwise Eligibility = 1 if the record date is more than 5 days after the SPP detail announcement, 0 otherwise. Table 3 Characteristics of firms that issue SPPs: descriptive statistics = natural logarithm of market capitalisation (SPPR) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Size (TA) = natural logarithm of total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Growth & investment (BE/MVE) = book value of equity (total shareholders equity (Aspect -#7010) less convertible equity (Aspect -#7015)) scaled by market value equity (market capitalisation) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Growth & investment (CapEx/TA) = absolute value of capital expenditure (Aspect -#9150) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Liquidity (CA/CL) = current assets (Aspect -#5020) divided by current liabilities (Aspect -#6010) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Profitability (FCF/TA) = net cash from operations (Aspect -#9100) less net cash from investing activities (Aspect -#9200) less total dividend on ordinary and preferred dividends paid out (Aspect -#9217) less repayment of borrowings (Aspect -#9215) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Profitability (EBITDA/TA) = earnings before interest and tax (Aspect -#8012) less depreciation and amortisation (Aspect -#8010) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Cash holdings = receipts from customers (Aspect -#800) less payments to suppliers and (Net cash) employees (Aspect -#801) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Cash holdings (Cash burn) = cash in the current period less cash in the prior period (Aspect -#4990) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) where current period is the balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Leverage (TD/TA) = book value of total debt (Aspect -#6000 and #6020) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Leverage (TD/(TD+MVE)) = book value of total debt (Aspect -#6000 and #6020) divided by the book value of total debt (Aspect -#6000 and #6020) plus the market value of equity (market capitalisation) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Dividend behaviour = 1 if a dividend was paid for the balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement and 0 otherwise Shareholder structure = percentage held by non-top 20 shareholders ((100 -Aspect -#709)/100) for the balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Overseas exchange = 1 if the firm is listed only on the Australian and/or New Zealand Stock Exchange and 0 otherwise Size (MC) = natural logarithm of market capitalisation (AGSM SPPR database) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Size (TA) = natural logarithm of total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Growth & investment (BE/MVE) = book value of equity (total shareholders equity (Aspect -#7010) less convertible equity (Aspect -#7015)) scaled by market value of equity (market capitalisation) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Growth & investment (CapEx/TA) = absolute value of capital expenditure (Aspect -#9150) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Liquidity (CA/CL) = current assets (Aspect -#5020) divided by current liabilities (Aspect -#6010) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Profitability (FCF/TA) = net cash from operations (Aspect -#9100) less net cash from investing activities (Aspect -#9200) less total dividend on ordinary and preferred dividends paid out (Aspect -#9217) and less repayment of borrowings (Aspect -#9215) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Profitability (EBITDA/TA) = earnings before interest and tax (Aspect -#8012) less depreciation and amortisation (Aspect -#8010) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Cash holdings (Net cash) = receipts from customers (Aspect -#800) less payments to suppliers and employees (Aspect -#801) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Cash holdings = cash in the current period less cash in the prior period (Aspect -#4990) scaled (Cash burn) by total assets (Aspect -#5090) where current period is the balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Leverage (TD/TA) = book value of total debt (Aspect -#6000 and #6020) scaled by total assets (Aspect -#5090) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Leverage (TD/(TD+MVE)) = book value of total debt (Aspect -#6000 and #6020) divided by the book value of total debt (Aspect -#6000 and #6020) plus the market value of equity (market capitalisation) for balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Dividend behaviour = 1 if a dividend was paid for the balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement and 0 otherwise Shareholder structure = percentage held by non-top 20 shareholders ((100 -Aspect -#709)/100) for the balance date prior to the SPP detail announcement Overseas exchange = 1 if the firm is listed only on the Australian and/or New Zealand Stock Exchange and 0 otherwise Table 8 Cross-sectional regression models of factors affecting the share price reaction to the SPP detail announcement (days -1 to +4), fitted by OLS: base case and various sub-samples *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level on a two-tailed test. Table 9 Long run share market performance of firms that adopted SPPs relative to two benchmarks: Firms in the same industry and of comparable size, and the market as a whole. 
